Abstract: Concern over the amount of state and local government debt in California and other states has been somewhat widely expressed. The purpose of this paper is to consider how policymakers can best evaluate these concerns regarding the level of traditional public debt in California (or other states). We do this by examining how the debt of California's subnational (state and local) governments has changed between 1992 and 2007, and then compares these changes in debt held by California governments to changes in the national average, and to changes in other specific states. Since additional information on total sub national debt by state will not be reported until after 2012, we also examine the borrowing behavior of California's subnational governments during the Great Recession (2008)(2009)(2010). Again, we contrast borrowing by California governments during this period to the past behavior of California governments and to the borrowing behavior of governments in other states. We conclude that through 2010, California's state and local government debt is not as bad as some have thought.
Introduction
Concern over the amount of state and local government debt in California and other states has been somewhat widely expressed. This paper's intent is a consideration of how policymakers can best evaluate these concerns regarding the level of traditional public debt in California. For the purpose of comparison across states, we define traditional public debt here in only the manner used by the US Census during this recessionary period to the past behavior of California governments, and to the borrowing behavior of governments in other states.
When making interstate comparisons, we believe it is appropriate to examine state and local government debt in a state added together, rather than the debt incurred by a state government alone. States differ dramatically in the degree to which the state or its local governments take responsibility for generating revenue, providing public services, and issuing debt. Examining only the state government component of the state and local fiscal system offers misleading comparisons across the states. Some state government authorities incur debt on behalf of their local governments. In other states, local governments are responsible for incurring debt directly. In every state, state governments generate revenue they then distribute to local governments in the form of intergovernmental grants that differ widely in magnitude. In some states, local governments can only incur debt after approval of the state government.
Conceptually, an assessment of the desirability of subnational debt levels is possible by examining affordability, optimality or comparability. Affordability involves comparing debt levels to the magnitude of the economy or to the size of the government budget, either currently or to a forecast of the future, and then judging whether it is affordable. Optimality recognizes the tie between debt and investment in public capital. The issue is whether government is investing in the quantity and quality of public capital desired by residents and financing the appropriate share of that cost with debt. This requires judging the uses of debt. Comparability involves evaluating debt by comparing the debt of other "similar" governments, after allowing for important differences in circumstances. We chose to use comparability here because of the difficulty (and controversy) of making the value judgments necessary to employ an affordability or optimality evaluation of a government's debt.
Measuring the magnitude of debt that a state or local government has incurred involves comparing aggregate debt (a stock) or components of that total debt (such as long-term debt) to various annual measures of fiscal and economic capacity (which are flows). Here, we use three measures of relative state and local debt burden: (1) real debt per person (that is, debt adjusted for inflation and divided by population); (2) debt as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) for the jurisdiction; and (3) debt as a percentage of the appropriate annual government revenue. We also examine the annual cost to the government from outstanding debt (that is, the annual interest payments on the debt as a percentage of annual revenue).
traditional bonds are taken from The Bond Buyer Market Statistics at http://www.bondbuyer.com/marketstatistics/#SemiannualandAnnualStatistics.
State and Local Government Debt in the USA
and California, 1992-2007
All State and Local Governments in the USA
In 2008, US subnational (state and local) governments had accumulated a total outstanding traditional debt of nearly $2.6 trillion, or about $8500 per person. This debt amounted to nearly 18% of GDP and 96% of the annual revenue for all state and local governments. State governments (or state government authorities) account for about 39% of that total subnational government debt, with the remainder the financial responsibility of the wide variety of local governments. However, a snapshot of subnational government debt at any one time is not very informative, as debt is inherently a long-run phenomenon. Since 1992, more than 98% of state and local government debt has arisen from long-term bond issues of more than 1 year, with the funds used to invest usually in a variety of capital projects. Accordingly, the commitment to most of the current outstanding subnational government debt occurred in the past -some as much as 20 years ago or more -to fund facilities that will continue to provide services into the future. In addition, comparing aggregate debt to annual magnitudes, such as GDP or government revenue, provides a misleading indication if the year selected is not typical in an economic or fiscal sense (e.g., a recession year or a year with unusually high income or revenue). Therefore, it is more informative to examine trends in debt over a relatively long period.
Real per capita debt (in 2009 dollars) for all state and local governments increased from $5917 in 1992, to $8351 in 2007. Nationally, since 1992, state and local government debt increased in relative magnitude compared to both GDP and in real, per capita terms. Although debt rose faster than GDP, it did not increase faster than state and local government revenue. In 2007, before the consequences of the Great Recession, aggregate state and local government debt amounted to about 79% of state and local revenue, roughly the same level as in 1992 and 1997. The bulk of the increase in state and local debt since 1992 was long-term debt for traditional public purposes, and particularly long-term debt held by school districts. Nationally, school district long-term debt increased from 6% of total state and local long-term debt in 1992, to 13% in 2007. Because the overall local government share of long-term debt has not changed, school district debt must have replaced debt by counties, municipalities and special districts. The share of long-term debt for all three of the latter types of localities has declined. Thus, the national story is that state and local governments have borrowed more, but especially for investments in K-12 education.
Figures 1-4 illustrate changes in the period since 1992. The bulk of the increase in state and local debt since 1992 was in long-term debt for traditional public purposes, and in particular, long-term debt held by school districts. Among these 4 years, fiscal years 1992 and 2002 came at the end of national recessions, whereas fiscal years 1997 and 2007 came after periods of economic growth.6 Therefore, it makes most sense to compare 2007 with 1997. Comparing these 2 years suggests that total outstanding state and local government debt is about the same size relative to total state and local government revenue. Therefore, as of 2007, in a historical sense, it does not appear that state and local governments in the USA incurred outstanding debt disproportionate to their annual budgets.
Despite the increase in the relative magnitude of state and local government debt since 1992, annual interest paid on that debt by state and local governments in aggregate decreased substantially relative to annual revenue; the path of this decline being from 5.5% of revenue in 1992, to 4.5% in 1997, to 4.8% in 2002, and to 3.5% in 2007 . This reduction in annual interest cost resulted from the combination of changes in debt relative to revenue, and changes in the interest rates that state and local governments face. Disaggregating by type of subnational government, annual interest paid on outstanding debt decreased as a share of revenue from 1992 to 2007 for all types of state and local governments, except for school districts, as shown in Figure 5 . This result reinforces the point that much of the growth in this recent 15-year period has been in debt by or on behalf of schools.7 However, even after accounting for this growth, school districts spent less than 3% of their overall revenue on interest payments in 2007. An even fuller discussion of the recent history of US state and local debt is in Wassmer and Fisher (2011) . and a few key differences are immediately apparent from the summary data in Table 1 . Compared to the US averages for debt measured in per capita terms and as a percentage of a state's GDP, California has issued less debt for short-term public purposes and for private purposes, but issued more for long-term public purposes. Since long-term public purposes makes up a greater share of state debt, outstanding long-term debt for traditional public purposes is a bit higher in California than other states. A substantial portion of the increase in long-term debt in California since 1992 has arisen from growing school district borrowing. As shown in Figure  6 , between 1992 and 2007, school district debt increased from 1.4% to 15.1% of outstanding long-term debt. The state government's share of long-term debt remained at about 34% of the total, whereas the shares for other types of local governments (counties, municipalities and special districts) declined. Thus, over this 15-year period, long-term school district debt essentially replaced longterm debt by other local governments.
California State and Local Governments
The annual interest payments on debt remain a relatively low fraction of subnational government budgets in the California. For state and local governments in 2007, interest paid on debt took 3.2% of revenue in California and 3.5% nationally. California's relative interest payments are the same as in Arizona and Florida, and less than in Illinois, New York, and Texas. For school districts, interest payments take 2.6% of revenue in California and 2.8% nationally.
In summary, the debt of state and local governments in California in 2007 was not substantially different relative to the size of a state's economy, or to subnational government budgets in comparison to other large, urban states. California has issued less short-term debt than other states and has used public debt for private purposes to a smaller degree than other states. Consequently, outstanding long-term debt for traditional public purposes is only a bit higher in California than the average observed for all states. A substantial portion of the increase in long-term debt in California since 1992 has arisen from growing school district borrowing. The outstanding debt and the annual interest payments on debt remain a relatively low fraction of subnational government budgets in the state. 
Regression Analysis of Interstate Differences in Debt, 1992-2007
We use a statistical regression analysis of the level of state and local government debt of the 50 states between 1992 and 2007 to quantify the factors that have influenced differences in debt among the states over the time period observed and to determine if state-specific trends (after adjusting for expected causal factors) caused California's debt to be above or below that observed in other states. After adjusting for economic and fiscal differences among the states, such a regressionbased comparison offers one way of determining whether California is out of line with other states regarding its degree of state and local debt activity. Before we undertook the desired statistical analyses of total debt and debt issues, we reviewed the following relevant previous research on this topic. Bahl and Duncombe (1993) were one of the first studies to use regression analysis to determine the factors that influence differences in debt burdens across states.8 They hypothesized that differences in these values were caused by four general factors: (1) service demand differences accounted for by population and income differences; (2) expansionary government differences 8 Regression analysis requires a model where the value of one dependent variable changes based on multiple other independent (or explanatory) variables (http://en.wikipedia.org/ wiki/Regression_analysis). Regression analysis then allows the calculation of how a one-unit change in one of the explanatory variables influences a change in the dependent variable, holding the other explanatory variables constant. controlled for with per capita spending in different expenditure categories and state debt limitations; (3) debt mix as measured by private or public nonguaranteed debt as a fraction of total debt; and (4) the historic debt burden from 1977. Bahl and Duncombe found that population, population density, historic debt burden, and current government expenditure exert a positive influence on most of the measures of current debt used in their analysis. Trautman (1995) was interested in finding the effect of debt limitation rules on the issuance of debt, but included other political and institutional factors expected to influence state debt activity. Her findings supported the notion that debt management and strong executive control reduce the amount of debt activity exhibited by a state. Clingermayer and Wood (1995) hypothesized that the observed differences in debt levels are the result of economic, political and institutional factors. All of the economic factors included as explanatory variables in their regression study were statistically relevant and exhibit the expected direction of effect. A more liberal and electorally competitive state exhibited greater debt, whereas a state with a Democrat as governor and a Republican legislature exhibited relatively less debt. Surprisingly, they found that the presence of tax and spending limits in a state was associated with greater per capita debt levels.
Finally, Ellis and Schansberg (1999) examined the reasons why the change in real long-term debt levels varied across states by designing a regression study that weighed this measure by either a state's population or its total state and local government spending. They found that a higher percentage of young people in the population (old) exerted a positive (negative) influence on both measures of a state's change in debt level, whereas per capita income exerted a positive influence on change in debt per capita and a negative influence on change in debt per government spending. Only a few of the included political and institutional explanatory variables exerted a statistically significant influence on either debt measure.
Based on this earlier research, a consensus emerges on the general casual factors that influence differences in long-term debt across the states. Broadly defined, the categories are economics, politics, institutions and demographics. Understanding this, we begin our regression analysis with the simple relationship that debt in period t (D t ), is equivalent to debt in the previous period t-1 (D t-1 ), plus new bond issues in period t (B t ), less bond retirement in period t (R t ): 
The key results from this analysis are as follows: 1. Our regression analysis confirms the continuing growth in state and local government debt over this period, even after allowing for the effects of the economic and social variables affecting debt. State and local governments increased debt more than might be expected based on the included explanatory variables. 2. For public purpose debt outstanding by all types of state and local governments and for debt outstanding by school districts, debt is persistent. That is, the amount of outstanding debt in 1 year correlates positively to debt in past years. This is perhaps not surprising because only a relatively small fraction of total debt observed in a given year, is incurred or retired in that year. Therefore, state and local governments with high debt in the past are more likely to have high debt in a current period. 3. The one socioeconomic factor that exerts a persistent positive effect on state and local government debt (after controlling for other demographic, economic, political, institutional, and borrowing cost factors) is the percentage of a state's population that attends K-12 public schools. A 1% difference in the share of a state's population in public schools is associated with higher real per capita debt of $117 (given an average real per capita debt over the observed period of $6711). This suggests that public school enrollment significantly influenced outstanding state and local government debt during this period, perhaps representing borrowing to build or maintain schools. This is consistent with the aggregate perspective discussed previously showing that debt held by school districts had become a much larger share of total state and local government debt. 4. There is some evidence, although not as strong as for the other findings noted above, that state and local government debt serves as a substitute for federal aid. Some of the results suggest that outstanding debt is lower in states that receive higher federal grants per capita (after controlling for other demographics, economics, politics, institutions, and borrowing cost factors). 5. Compared to other states, there is evidence that governments in California made relatively greater use of debt in total. Based on our regression estimation, after controlling for demographic, economic, political, institutional and borrowing cost factors expected to influence debt issue, total outstanding traditional debt held by California governments over this period was greater than expected in comparison to 20 other states. Compared to only four other states, outstanding traditional debt held by California governments over this period was less than would be expected. When disaggregating by type of debt, governments in California made relatively greater use of debt for public purposes, and relatively less use of debt for private purposes. Confirming the casual perspective from the overall trends, school districts in California also incurred relatively high levels of debt compared to many states.
The application of this statistical method to analyzing state and local government debt and comparing governments in California to those in other states suggests that governments in California relied relatively more on debt for public purposes than one might expect compared to other states. However, much of the growth in debt over the 15 years from 1992 to 2007 seems related to growth in enrollment in public primary and secondary schools, suggesting that the increased debt corresponds to increased investment in public education facilities. Moreover, even with these levels of outstanding debt, the annual interest cost of the debt represented a declining share of subnational government budgets in California.
State and Local Borrowing during the Great Recession
The Figure 7 shows real total bond issues by year, for all state and local governments in the USA, separated into sales of long-term and short-term bonds. For both short-term and long-term issues, new debt undertaken by states and localities was low in 2008 (the first full year of the recession, and when the most uncertainty existed in the US financial markets). The volume of bonds issued by state and local governments increased in 2009 and 2010. In aggregate, 2010 was similar to 2007, the year prior to the financial market crisis and recession.
By sheer magnitude, California had the largest amount of long-term bond sales among all states in every year (2008, 2009 and 2010) . Nevertheless, this absolute dollar amount of bond sales reflects California's size compared to other states. A simple way to adjust for the difference in state magnitudes is to examine bond issues and debt relative to population. It is important to note that in addition to the availability of Build America Bonds in 2009, municipal bond interest rates declined almost continuously during that year. According to the Bond Buyer Index, average municipal bond interest rates (20-year, general obligation debt), declined from 5.07% in January 2009 to 4.21% in December of that year. In contrast, rates had risen substantially in 2008, the first year of the recession. It is feasible that the decline in nontaxable interest rates during 2009 induced new bond issuance by a number of states and localities.
Regression Analysis of Interstate Borrowing Differences, 2008-2010
Just as we earlier offered an interstate analysis of debt by regression analysis, it is also appropriate to do the same to examine annual bond issue volume by states. The analytical approach is a bit different, because the question here is annual borrowing by state and local governments rather than total outstanding debt, which is the cumulative result of past borrowing. However, as before, this regression approach permits statistical adjustment for a wide variety of demographic, economic, political, institutional and borrowing cost factors that may differ among the states and may influence annual borrowing. We use the same explanatory variables noted earlier in functional relationships (1) through (5), but also include the percentage of a state's roads deemed in "poor or mediocre" (2) state and local government issues of Build America Bonds (which are taxable with a direct federal subsidy) from April 2009 through December 2010 for all 50 states. In addition, a dummy variable set equal to 1 for California was included to see if there is any evidence that borrowing by governments in California was substantially different from that expected after controlling for the above factors.
We summarize the results in Table 5 that show the statistically significant effects for a 1% increase (or from going from 0 to 1 for a dummy variable) in a given causal factor on the two types of bond issues. Several results in Table 5 state issued more non-BABs, if the state's fiscal condition was stronger, if they placed no limits on debt issue, and if expenditure by local governments in the state was a greater percentage of overall subnational expenditure. Alternatively, these regressions show that a state is more likely to have issued overall state and local debt (including BABs) the greater the percentage of its population enrolled in K-12 public schools, the more liberal its citizens in political ideology, the greater its gross state product per capita, and the greater its starting debt in 2007. The results also show that more debt of this overall type was issued in 2009 than 2008. This trend toward greater debt issue than in 2008 continued in 2010, but not to the same degree as in 2009. Checking for only the positive influences on BAB issues, state and local governments issued greater BABs the greater the percentage of its population enrolled in K-12 public schools, the greater its gross state product per capita, and the greater its starting debt in 2007. Unlike overall debt issue, BAB issues were also influenced positively by states having roads in poor or mediocre condition, a mandatory revenue or spending limit in place, and if they had no state-wide income tax. Statistical significance is identified here as 90% confidence that the expected effect is nonzero in a two-tailed test. Most important to a consideration of how California compares to other states regarding the recent issuance of debt, we found that the California dummy variable in the regressions never exerted a statistically significant influence. Governments in California issued overall debt during 2008 to 2010, and Build America debt during 2009 and 2010, no more than would be expected based on the state's economic, social, and political characteristics. Recall from Figures 8 and 9 that California respectively ranks fourth and third from the top for per capita amount of Build America Bond issues and per capita amount of yearly long-term bond issues. We have shown through regression analysis that this is the result of economic, political and social characteristics in the state that drive greater bond issues and not an independent California Effect.
Our direct statistical test of the possibility that Build America Bonds served as substitutes for traditional nontaxable bonds among states during 2009 and 2010 confirms this idea. The regression approach we used (two-stage least squares) assumes that the volume of one type of bond sold influences the other, with the decision about both bond offerings being made concurrently. As necessary to implement a two-stage least squares analysis, we note that a state's personal marginal income tax rates and the percentage of the population that pay the higher rates are expected to influence nontaxable bond sales in a state, but not Build America Bonds. If the upper marginal income tax rates in a state are relatively high, and there are more state residents paying these higher rates, a state's residents may be especially interested in buying nontaxable bonds issued in their state, which permits that state to offer lower rates of return on them. A lower rate of return lowers a state's borrowing cost and encourages it to offer more debt.
The results from our two-stage least squares estimation shows that traditional nontaxable bonds and Build America Bonds are imperfect substitutes. Across all states, an additional 1% increase in traditional nontaxable bonds sold results in about a 1.11% decrease in issues in Build America Bonds. The two types of borrowing are imperfect substitutes because the substitution is not one-for-one. The regression results show that BABs offered over 2009-2010 would decrease by about 11.1% if a state decided instead to increase traditional debt by 10%. If BAB issues were perfect substitutes for non-BAB issues, the decrease would only be 10%. Understanding this, the creation of Build America Bonds served their desired purpose and acted as a stimulus measure in 2009 and 2010 that increased total subnational borrowing. Indeed, as shown in Figure 10 , this is precisely the situation in California when comparing 2009 to 2008.
Summary of Findings
The results just described offer a clearer picture of state and local debt before the Great Recession (during the period from 1992 to 2007) and state and local government borrowing during it (2008 to 2010). We have also shown the ways in which behavior of state and local governments in California toward traditional debt accumulation and issuance sometimes is similar, and sometimes differs from other states.
From 1992 to 2007, state and local government debt clearly increased compared to population and GDP. This was true nationally, as well as in California. Indeed, governments in California seem to have used debt relatively more than expected compared to other states, at least debt for public purposes. However, the amount of debt outstanding did not increase compared to the amount of state and local government revenue, and even more importantly, the annual interest payments on the outstanding debt declined compared to state and local budgets. Again, this was the case nationally and in California.
In addition, most of the increase in state and local debt during this period was long-term debt for public purposes, especially debt incurred by school districts for K-12 education. Even more pronounced in California than nationally was the dominance of increased school district debt. All of this suggests that states, California included, acted appropriately up to 2007 in incurring debt for traditional public purposes at an interest cost that was declining.
Following the start of the Great Recession, governments in California increased their borrowing in 2009 and 2010 compared to the historical pattern and relative to most other states. A combination of traditional nontaxable bonds and Build America Bonds accomplished this increase. Although many subnational governments increased borrowing during these years, California's state and local governments were particularly aggressive, especially with Build America Bonds. Governments in California took advantage of the low cost of borrowing during those years and the incentive provided by the relatively large federal government subsidy with Build America Bonds. However, aggregate borrowing by the state and local governments in California decreased in 2010 compared to 2009. Perhaps most important to an assessment of debt issues in California between 2008 and 2010 is our regression-based finding that after controlling for economic, political and social conditions expected to influence debt issuance across the states, California offered no more than other states. Therefore, we find no evidence that California was out of line with other states in its recent debt issuance practices.
This research also demonstrates how a policymaker can use statistical regression analysis to evaluate any given state's debt and borrowing behavior by controlling for economic, social and political factors that influence borrowing and that vary among the states. For instance, the results reveal that states with greater affluence, less unemployment, greater debt accumulation, less end-of-year state fiscal balances as a percentage of state government expenditure, a greater "Liberal" political ideology, and a greater percentage of population enrolled in K-12 public education; exhibited greater per capita, real annual borrowing during the Great Recession.
Given the modest cost of debt as measured by the relatively low annual interest costs in subnational budgets in California in 2007, the higher borrowing during 2008 and 2009 may not be a long-term concern if borrowing returns to its traditional, long-term pattern. The decrease in borrowing in 2010, and the end of the Build America Bond program, suggests that this may be the case. Even so, continued monitoring by California policymakers seems prudent.
